By Dave Workman
Senior Editor
A 211-page joint congressional staff report on Operation Fast and Furious names key officials at the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (BATF) and blames them for the way the gun trafficking investigation was launched, managed and ultimately derailed.
The report, which is the first of three dealing with the Fast and Furious scandal, was prepared for Congressman Darrell Issa, chairman of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and Senator Charles Grassley, ranking Republican on the Senate Judiciary Committee. Grassley. Issa’s committee has been investigating Fast and Furious for more than 18 months and Grassley was the first man on Capitol Hill to launch inquiries about the failed operation.
TGM obtained an advance copy of the thick report. It identifies BATF officials who were aware of the operation and allowed it to go forward.
In an exclusive interview, Sen. Grassley told TGM that “Right now, the ATF has major problems.”
But he noted that the BATF is not unique. Other federal agencies have had problems over the years, he indicated, and typically nothing changes unless sometimes drastic measures are taken to get everyone’s attention.
“If heads don’t roll,” he observed, “there is no change in behavior.”
Grassley acknowledged that it will be up to Senate Judiciary Chairman Patrick Leahy whether any action is taken by that committee. He has essentially been probing Fast and Furious on his own, with some support from a few of his colleagues, on the Senate side.
But Grassley, an Iowa Republican known for his non-partisan oversight investigations, predicted that those responsible for Fast and Furious will not be able to hide.
“You hold them accountable and that brings about change,” he said.
The staff report also notes that Arizona gun dealers became “unwitting partners” in the gun walking scheme. Early in the Obama administration, it was those gun dealers who fell under criticism from anti-gunners for allegedly selling guns that ended up in the hands of Mexican drug cartel gunmen.
“In the fall of 2009,” the report says, “the Phoenix Field Division opened an investigation into a suspected firearms straw purchasing ring. As part of the investigation, ATF relied heavily on support from cooperating Federal Firearms Licensees (“FFLs”). Sometimes, these gun dealers would inform ATF when suspected straw purchasers entered their stores to acquire weapons. On other occasions, ATF would alert the FFLs in advance that straw purchasers were heading to their stores and requested that the FFLs stock up on certain models of firearms.
“These FFLs became increasingly worried about selling firearms to obvious straw purchasers,” the report continues. “ATF Group Supervisor (David) Voth assuaged their fears by arranging meetings with the U.S. Attorney’s Office and promising them that ATF was closely monitoring and ultimately interdicting the purchased weapons. Since the FFLs depended on ATF’s regulatory arm for their livelihood, they agreed to make these sales.
“In reality,” the report says, “ATF agents in Phoenix had no intention of interdicting these firearms, even though Group VII agents often received contemporaneous, or even advance, notice of illegal firearms purchases. In some cases this was because ATF believed due to instruction from the U.S. Attorney’s Office that sufficient legal grounds didn’t exist. In other cases it was because
ATF refused to ‘compromise the bigger case’ by taking any steps that might allow the straw purchasers to become aware ATF was watching them—even if that meant the straw purchasers were allowed to transfer the guns to traffickers. Group VII abandoned the traditional law enforcement techniques of disruption and deterrence by failing to confront or question the vast majority of the straw purchasers in Fast and Furious, preferring instead to watch and wait.”
Sen. Grassley noted that these dealers sent e-mails to the BATF and Justice Department detailing their concerns about the gun sales.
Key Officials blamed
The report identifies several BATF officials who were responsible for what became a debacle. Among them is William Hoover, former ATF deputy director, who retired this week according to independent sources. Hoover was the official who ordered an “exit strategy” for the operation when he realized it was getting out of hand, but according to the report, that strategy was never followed.
“In the spring of 2010,” the report says, “concern was mounting among ATF leadership in Washington about the large volume of weapons being sold under Fast and Furious. The case became so large that the ATF Deputy Director, William Hoover, requested an exit strategy for the case—something he had never done before. Despite Hoover’s request, the drafting of the exit strategy was delayed for more than a month.”
“Hoover,” according to the report, “was also instrumental in briefing Department of Justice personnel about the status of Fast and Furious, and had previously discussed gunwalking concerns in another case with Bill Newell.”
William Newell was the special agent in charge at the BATF’s Phoenix field office during the Fast and Furious operation. He was also in charge during the earlier Operation Wide Receiver, another investigation that allowed guns to “walk.” The report notes that the US Attorney’s office in Phoenix “declined to prosecute one case because of the number of weapons ATF allowed to ‘walk’ during the investigation.”
According to the report Newell “had a history of using reckless gunwalking tactics during his investigations.”
“Bill Newell,” the report says, “was a major promoter of the strategy in Fast and Furious. Though he had been the Special Agent in Charge in Phoenix for several years, he somehow failed to understand the basic legal standards needed for interdicting firearms and questioning potential suspects. According to testimony of the other ATF agents, Bill Newell did not have significant experience as a case agent or working street operations. His inexperience at the field agent level may have been a contributing factor to his ignorance of legal thresholds. Instructing his agents to abide by incorrect standards was a costly mistake that prevented interrogation, disruption, and possible arrest of straw purchasers.”
When Newell appeared as a witness before Issa’s House Oversight Committee in July 2011, his testimony infuriated the California congressman, who called him a “paid non-answerer.”
Also taking heat are William McMahon, former deputy assistant director for western field operations, and Mark Chaitt, former assistant director for field operations. Chaitt was McMahon’s supervisor, and McMahon was Newell’s supervisor at BATF headquarters in Washington, DC. The report says Chaitt, “had several opportunities to put an end to the operation but failed to do so. He ultimately played a passive role during Fast and Furious, allowing those above him to make decisions and those below him to implement those decisions.”
McMahon, according to the report, “received a wealth of information about Fast and Furious, but did not view it as his role as supervisor to ask questions about events in the field. He has publicly admitted to having failed in his duty to read information presented to him about the case.”
Chait and Hoover also reportedly “had several opportunities to put an end to the operation but failed to do so.”
“Hoover knew that Newell had employed risky tactics in the past as SAC yet failed to monitor him closely,” the report asserts. “Either Hoover did not ask the right questions or simply turned a blind eye to the unavoidable reality that reckless gunwalking tactics were being used again in Fast and Furious.”
McMahon and Chaitt may retire soon from the agency, sources say.
The report is also criticized former acting ATF director Kenneth Melson, who was in charge during Fast and Furious. He was reassigned to a job in the Justice Department. Melson “had a distinguished background, knew little of the operational details of Fast and Furious, and was committed to full cooperation with Congress.
According to the report, Melson “ultimately…still bears a significant measure of responsibility for failing to ensure that ATF headquarters personnel adequately supervised the Phoenix Field Division.”
US Attorney
The report offers heavy criticism of the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Phoenix. Former US Attorney Dennis Burke “frequently met with Bill Newell and received updates on the case.” Burke resigned suddenly in August of last year “as a result of the fallout from Operation Fast and Furious.”
His second-in-command, Assistant U.S. Attorney Emory Hurley, was allowed by ATF supervisors “to dictate when ATF agents were allowed to interdict weapons during the case.”
“Hurley delayed the indictments in Fast and Furious for months, frustrating ATF officials,” the report says.
Patrick Cunningham, former chief of the Phoenix criminal division, “invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination to avoid answering any questions” after he was subpoenaed to testify before Issa’s Oversight Committee.
There are two other parts of the report still to come. It says it “presents an extensive, detailed narrative to aid in assessing the culpability of each of the aforementioned individuals. This narrative is based on transcribed interviews with 24 individuals, some covering multiple days; informal interviews with more than 50 individuals; and the review of more than 10,000 pages of documents, 6,989 of them produced by the Justice Department pursuant to subpoena.”
“It must be noted, however, that the Committees’ access to information has been incomplete,” the executive summary explains. “The Justice Department has withheld tens of thousands of pages of documents and denied access to numerous witnesses, including ATF Case Agent Hope MacAllister, ATF Co- Case Agent Tonya English, and AUSA Emory Hurley—the central individuals running the case. As of January 2012, the Justice Department had produced 80,000 pages to its Office of the
Inspector General (“OIG”), which also has virtually unfettered access to Department employees,
and interviewed them on multiple occasions. In fact, of the small number of documents the
Justice Department produced to the Committees, a substantial portion were heavily redacted, and many pages related to investigations other than Fast and Furious, including approximately 1,200 pages on other operations. Accordingly, the reasonable inferences drawn from the available evidence in this report could be viewed differently if critical information has been concealed in the documents and testimony withheld from Congress. Nevertheless, this report—the first in a series of three—presents the best information available as of now.”
The report notes that Attorney General Eric Holder was held in contempt of Congress for failing to provide thousands of pages of subpoenaed documents.
